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Abstract 
Due to the extensive timeframes and the transfer of risk towards the preferred special purpose 
vehicle, there is more value at stake in public-private partnership projects in relation to 
traditional public procurement projects. The contractual complexity and the high bidding cost are 
open sesames for inexperienced contractors to refrain from the opportunity. Governments are 
currently seeking for mechanisms to increase competition, like reimbursing losing bidders for 
their research efforts. This study encompasses the bidding framework in a game-theoretical 
fashion while taking discrepancies in the bidders’ experience levels into account. A contractor’s 
strategy is composed of the pre-tender investment willingness and the targeted mark-up. 
Approximation algorithms to derive the Nash equilibrium are proposed. Furthermore, it is 
investigated how governmental policies may modify the bidding equilibrium. The theoretical 
findings are triangulated by a qualitative discussion with practitioners from the PPP field. The 
dynamics reveal the importance of the controllable and uncontrollable project risk that could 
result in a reluctance for the inexperienced player and a constriction of the market. This 
occurrence of an oligopolistic situation might be overcome through the introduction of 
government compensation policies despite the fact that these could come at a fair price.  
Keywords: public-private partnership procurement, project management, bidding, game theory, 
simulation 
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1. Introduction 
In the early nineties, public-private partnerships (PPPs) appeared on the scene as a cutting-
edge long-term contractual arrangement between a private contractor and the government. PPPs 
were believed to guarantee greater value for money compared to traditional public contracting in 
which the contractor was just responsible for building a particular well-defined infrastructure 
project. PPPs do not only incur the realization of the infrastructure project, but also consider the 
design and operation and the maintenance afterwards. Therefore, synergies are realized because 
of efficiency gains by and risk transfers towards the private entity or special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). Since they have seen the daylight, PPPs have gained importance and their number has 
proliferated. The PPP landscape is wide which is proven by the variety in definitions (e.g., Van 
Ham & Koppenjan, 2001; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Wettenhall, 2010). For the purpose of our 
research, all the ornaments and often country- or sector-specific features are removed. A public-
private partnership is defined as a settlement between a public party and a private sector 
consortium to engage in a long-term contractual agreement for designing, building, operating 
and/or maintaining capital intensive projects, while trying to attain value for money by the 
appropriate allocation of risk. Because of the long-term feature of these projects, PPPs are not 
always a bed of roses. Typical textbook cases of the Eurotunnel project (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009) 
and the New Southern Rail Project in Sydney (Ng & Loosemore, 2007) underline the possible 
disastrous outcomes and form another argument to put an emphasis on carefully planning these 
risky projects (Zwikael & Sadeh, 2007).  
This paper offers a theoretical approach in analyzing the procurement stage of PPP projects. 
Because of its complexity and riskiness, long-term PPP projects require more preparation than 
traditional infrastructure projects. After an initial prequalification of interested consortia by the 
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government, qualified concessionaires are invited for tender. The consortia have to prepare a 
proposal that will be submitted to the government which involves pre-tender research costs (e.g., 
consulting costs, design costs and market studies). Empirical evidence by KPMG (2010) reports 
average research costs of 1.5% to 2% of the total project cost. These pre-tender research costs or 
bidding costs are claimed to be a burden for contractors and concessionaires because they do not 
guarantee to be awarded with the contract (Carrillo et al., 2008). Basically, each consortium will 
first determine how much money to invest in pre-tender research and secondly he will have to 
determine the appropriate mark-up. Due to the complexity, the high contingencies and the 
bidding costs, policy makers often argue that the market is too narrow in some jurisdictions, like 
in Australia, New Zealand or western European countries where often only two or three private 
entities show interest in particular high-risk PPPs. In order to open up the playing field and 
incentivize entrants, the public institutions sometimes introduce reimbursements for the incurred 
pre-tender investment costs. However, there is no global agreement on the magnitude of these 
compensations (KPMG, 2010). In contrast to Australia for instance, Canada and France apply 
considerable compensations. Consequently, the scope of this paper is two-fold. On the one hand, 
the PPP procurement process is translated into an abstract analytical bidding model that 
addresses the questions what the equilibrium amount of pre-tender investment is and which 
mark-up is rationally convenient. More particularly, the dynamics of the strategic equilibrium are 
underlined and it is analyzed how a consortium’s behavior is influenced by the competitive 
position in the market and by the project complexity. On the other hand, the scope is directed 
towards the government to assess the effectiveness of common governmental policies with an 
emphasis on the impact of the introduction of a partial reimbursement of the pre-tender cost on 
the bidding equilibrium. This results in a set of policy guidelines in both the public as well as the 
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private sector’s interest. These stem from theoretical findings and are triangulated by 
practitioners’ experiences. Next to its contribution to the PPP procurement literature, this paper 
also supports the algorithmic game theory and auction theory from a methodological perspective. 
The next section gives an overview of the relevant literature that relates to the PPP 
procurement process and highlights the bridge with traditional auction theory. Section 3 covers 
the analytical foundation and subsequently describes two algorithmic approaches that are 
implemented for the equilibrium identification. Section 4 lists the theoretical findings from the 
simulation output and the sensitivity study, while the discussion section introduces the 
experience and feedback from practice. A general policy proposal together with the opportunities 
for further research conclude this paper.  
2. Literature review 
Also in the academic journals, PPPs have gained increasing attention and different authors 
have classified papers according to their research topics (Al-Sharif & Kaka, 2004; Ke et al., 
2009; Tang et al., 2010; De Clerck et al., 2012). The literature reviews show that the drivers and 
success factors for PPPs are a well-established topic. Concerning the procurement process itself, 
the focus has mainly been on the risk identification, its assessment and the allocation between the 
government and the contractor. This is proven by the number of empirical (e.g., Li et al., 2005; 
Jin, 2010; Chan et al., 2011) and, to a lesser extent, theoretical studies (e.g., Medda, 2007; 
Khazaeni et al., 2012) that have appeared in the literature. Bidding models that focus on the PPP 
competitive dialogue are scarce. From a theoretical stretch, it are especially pricing peculiarities 
of PPPs that have been considered. Firstly, an important field is the pricing of governmental 
support interventions to guarantee a minimum revenue in the course of the operation (e.g., Cheah 
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and Liu, 2006; Brandao and Saraivo, 2008; Ashuri et al., 2012) and the impact of governmental 
capacity regulations (Subprasom and Chen, 2006). A second aspect involves the determination of 
the concession period (e.g., Ng et al., 2007; Shen et al., 2007; Zhang, 2009). Last but not least, a 
multi-interest analysis of the financial, the social and the corporate stakes is introduced by Liou 
et al. (2011). These studies do not explicitly take the competition aspect into account. This is in 
contrast to Iyer and Sagheer (2012) who consider the bid winning potential of a mark-up and Xu 
et al. (2012) who have built a system dynamics model based on past experiences for pricing the 
concession. The bidding model presented in this paper makes abstraction of the elements that 
determine the final price and represents the mark-up as a single figure for the consortium as a 
whole. On the other hand, the added complexity lies in the introduction of a competitive 
environment and the bidding costs. Consequently, we hypothesize that the contractor’s behavior 
is significantly influenced by his opponents. Moreover, it is necessary not to overlook the bid 
preparation efforts. 
Empirically, it is acknowledged that bidding for PPPs is expensive (Carrillo et al., 2008; 
Chen and Doloi, 2008). Moreover, the government as a buyer prefers qualitative suppliers and 
aims to limit uncertainty (Riedl et al., 2013). Ho (2008) questions game-theoretically whether the 
quality of bidding would increase if the government reimburses the second-best bidder for his 
bidding costs. Ho (2008) argues against the reimbursement but considers homogeneous bidders, 
which deviates from empirical findings of Oo et al. (2010). Furthermore, Ho (2008) does not 
consider any contingencies. In contrast to Ho (2008), the model in this paper introduces 
differences in the experience levels between bidders and also includes uncertainty in the project 
outcome. This is a more realistic approach and eventually results in the definition of 
circumstances where compensation is advised.  Because of possible project risks, winning a 
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contract is not a guarantee for a long-term profit. An attempt to combine the risk a winner faces 
and the current competitive mark-up determination in a non-PPP context was performed by Chao 
and Liou (2007) and Islam and Mohamed (2009). The PPP model additionally takes the 
investment option into account. Investment might reduce the long-term project risk and might 
result in a higher quality bid. 
The study of this PPP tendering format relates to auction theory and the competitive bidding 
literature that was initiated by Friedman (1956). In a first instance, this particular bidding setting 
introduces uncertainty in the cost estimates, which was introduced by Curtis & Maines (1973) 
and Naert & Weverbergh (1978). Takano et al. (2014) extend the single-project environment 
with uncertain project cost estimates towards a dynamic model with a sequence of projects and 
resource constraints. These models only consider the mark-up decisions, while the PPP model 
that is presented in this paper also examines a pre-tender investment choice. Through the 
investment choice, a contractor can reduce the cost uncertainty and directly increase his bid 
winning potential. In order to be able to analytically characterize the equilibrium, traditional 
auction theory often assumes homogeneous bidders and studies symmetric equilibria. The PPP 
simulation model does not take these simplifications into account and might therefore attain 
more insights. Another stream of research within the auction theory field studies the introduction 
of investment incentives in auctions and where investments lead to distributional upgrades of the 
cost distributions. Tan (1992) is the initiator considering ex-ante symmetric firms. More recent 
work does consider the heterogeneity among bidders (e.g., Skitmore, 2008) and explores the 
introduction of subsidies for investments towards inefficient bidders (i.e., bidders with a cost 
disadvantage) in procurement auctions (e.g., Tan, 1992; Arozamena & Cantillon, 2002; Rothkopf 
et al., 2003). Arozamena & Cantillon (2002) study the investments for cost reductions and 
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conclude that incentives actually have an inhibiting effect on investment due to the expectation 
of fiercer competition. The PPP model of this paper acknowledges that compensations result in 
fiercer competition but this does not necessarily mean that the investment behavior is reduced for 
the players. Rothkopf et al. (2003) are more in favor of subsidies and show that it lowers the 
expected procurement cost, while the PPP model requires some necessary differentiations and 
acknowledges that incentives may raise the government cost. A similar type of incentive creation 
in the R&D procurement literature is studied in Zhang et al. (2013) who elaborate on the 
competitive investment equilibrium. Through a sharing rate of the investment between the 
contractor and the principal, investment incentives are created. In the PPP model, the 
compensation is introduced in the market for fairness purposes and is not only attributed to a 
specific inefficient bidder or minority, but every ex-post losing bidder possibly gets 
compensated. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge there is no research that also includes the 
knowledge impact assumption in which upfront investments also reduce the uncertainty of the 
project cost.  
3. Methodology 
In order to grasp the main characteristics of the PPP procurement process, interviews with 
contractors, investment companies and public institutions have been performed next to a 
thorough analysis of former academic PPP research, publications and secondary data. The 
complexity of the PPP procurement environment has been reduced to a mathematically 
manageable level of abstraction, while maintaining generalizability through flexible 
parameterization which allows for an extensive sensitivity analysis. This analytical approach of 
course inhibits to get full insight in all the tendering dynamics. Moreover, it is a daunting task to 
collect data from the industry for validation purposes as it is a narrow and highly competitive 
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market. Nonetheless, the analytics and the simulation approach succeed in gaining insights into 
the bidding behavior dynamics and have been presented to practitioners in the field before 
moving on to define concrete policy recommendations.  
3.1 The procurement procedure  
The PPP procurement process is often country and sector specific. After the public 
communication, consortia can express their interest for the project. A consortium or special 
purpose vehicle consists of several companies like designers, construction contractors, 
subcontractors, suppliers and maintenance companies. In the remainder of the text, a consortium 
will be referred to as “a contractor or bidder” and we make abstraction of the internal structure of 
the special purpose vehicle. Generally, a prequalification mechanism will shortlist a number of 
contractors who are invited for tender. The number of shortlisted bidders is determined by the 
decision maker (the government). In practice, this number varies between two to four and in a 
rare case five bidders, depending on the jurisdiction, the interest and the complexity of the 
project. The shortlisted contractors will develop a project proposal that includes the design as 
well as process, management and financial information. This entire process is called the 
competitive dialogue: a government will communicate separately with each candidate 
concessionaire for reasons of clarification or adaptation, without sharing information from other 
bidders. In order to develop a competitive yet profitable project proposal, the contractor will 
perform investments in research and he will determine his mark-up. Assuming that all shortlisted 
bidders are known, the proposed bidding model considers each bidder’s strategic behavior for the 
bid preparation. After the proposal submission, the government is going to select the preferred 
bidder who is granted the project. This is essentially based on a cost/quality trade-off.  
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3.2 The decision variables 
Each contractor has to make two decisions for a particular project. On the one hand, the 
bidder has to determine the level of pre-tender research. This is the monetary effort that he will 
put into developing the project proposal and could consist for instance of consultancy costs, 
lobbying costs and design costs. In line with recent R&D research (Martzoukous and Zacharias, 
2013) and project management research (Lippman et al., 2013), the investment amount can have 
a two-fold impact. Firstly, the more a contractor invests in research, the more accurate will be the 
cost estimate. Secondly, the more upfront investment is undertaken, efficiency gains and 
innovative disclosures could guarantee a lower overall cost. On the other hand, the contractor has 
to determine a mark-up percentage for the project. The combination of the percentage of the 
project cost that is spent on pre-tender investments on the one hand and the mark-up percentage 
on the other hand is called a strategy. The purpose is to determine the equilibrium strategy for 
each player and will refer to the investment level a contractor is willing to undertake and the 
mark-up percentage he is aiming for.  
Moving the scope to the public sector, the government has the ability to decide on particular 
dimensions of the bidding process. Firstly, the government determines the number of candidate 
concessionaires who are up for the final bidding stage. Secondly, the public sector oversees the 
decision mechanism for the selection of the preferred bidder and could therefore opt for a lowest 
cost perspective, a maximum quality perspective or a trade-off between monetary and qualitative 
aspects. Thirdly, a topic of major concern is the fact whether the government should reimburse a 
fraction of the pre-tender research cost to any of the losing bidders so as to increase the 
investment incentives of the candidate contractors.  
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3.3 Assumptions  
During the interviews with several contractors and advisors (Table 5), they have confirmed 
that they do not consistently apply the same strategy for every project. Its risk attitude, its 
maturity in the market and the bidding environment (i.e., the number of competitors and their 
respective experience levels) are factors that influence a company’s bidding behavior. Ho (2008), 
who has addressed the bid compensation question before, considers all bidders being equal, 
while the heterogeneity of bidders was experimentally shown by Oo et al. (2010) and is 
explicitly confirmed by the interviewees. Therefore, an experience scale has been introduced. A 
player   has an experience level    [    ]. The experience level is an assessment of how 
familiar a particular contractor is with a particular market and could in practice easily be 
observed by the number of past projects within this specific field and within this particular 
jurisdiction.  
Assumption 1: The bidding environment information that consists of the number of bidders and 
their respective experience levels is common knowledge. 
The experience level of a player contributes in a two-fold way. First of all, more experience 
will result in a higher probability of winning the tender. It could be stated that the government 
reduces the bid price with a discount that represents the value it attributes to a higher experience 
level. Model-wise, one might say that the expected value of the cost function of a more 
experienced contractor is lower than that of his less experienced counterparts. Another 
interpretation is that experience results in a direct cost impact because of economies of scale, 
efficiency gains and the familiarity with the market. Secondly, experience has a knowledge 
impact in terms of the accuracy of the estimated project cost. Equivalently to the impact of the 
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experience, a contractor’s pre-tender investment contributes in two ways to the transformation of 
the cost curve. Pre-tender investment shifts the cost curve to the left due to innovative 
disclosures and efficiency gains, resulting in a direct increase in the probability of winning. 
Besides, the variance of the cost distribution decreases as investment leads to more accurate cost 
estimates. The variance of the cost distribution reflects the complexity or the risk of the project. 
For reasons of simplicity, risk is categorized in two types: an uncontrollable part that is the same 
for all contractors (e.g., force majeure risk, risk of contract renegotiation by the government or 
macroeconomic risk) and a controllable part (e.g., demand risk, project risk) that can be reduced 
or mitigated through the appropriation of experience or the performance of research investments. 
When a project has a fairly repetitive nature, experience will be the main contributor to the 
uncertainty reduction, while if it is highly innovative, the investment is of paramount importance. 
In summary, this results in three assumptions. 
Assumption 2: The complexity or risk of a project is translated into the variance of the cost 
distribution and consists of a controllable part and an uncontrollable part. 
Assumption 3: The more experienced a player is and the more a contractor has invested in pre-
tender research, the lower the variance of the cost distribution (knowledge impact assumption). 
Assumption 4: The more experienced a player is and the more a contractor has invested in 
research, the higher the probability of winning and the lower the expected project cost (direct 
cost impact assumption). 
The quantitative impact of assumption 3 for player   will be given by a fraction    and for 
assumption 4 by   
 . In the modeling procedure, the government will select the lowest-bidding 
contractor. Nevertheless, assumption 4 inherently also reflects the cost/quality trade-off: if the 
13 
 
government would put a greater emphasis on quality and experience, the contractor’s cost 
distribution shift would be more significant if he invests more in research or has more 
experience. So in fact assumption 4 puts a monetary value on the preference for more qualitative 
bids or for more experienced contractors by rewarding them with a discounted bid, which makes 
the next assumption valid in a PPP context. 
Assumption 5: The government selects the lowest bidding contractor. If the government installs a 
percentage-wise bidding cost reimbursement policy, bid compensations are equally attributed to 
all losing bidders.  
Before moving on to put these assumptions into numerical terms, it is necessary to consider 
assumption 6. 
Assumption 6: All participants in the game are able to make accurate estimations of the 
parameters that are related to assumptions 2 to 4. 
This assumption is in line with practical experience. Both contractors as well as the 
government are able to assess the degree of complexity of a project, based on for instance similar 
previous experiences. A social housing project is less complex than a toll road or a specialized 
hospital project. Last but not least, assumption 7 summarizes the contractors’ preference: 
Assumption 7: Contractors maximize the expected pay-off. 
Contractors should consider Pareto optimal strategies. These are strategies that result in a 
maximum expected pay-off for a given standard error of the pay-off. These strategies are on the 
efficient frontier. The results that are presented look at the strategy that was found to generate the 
highest expected pay-off.  
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3.4 The game-theoretical model 
Game theory succeeds in dealing with multiple agents who will optimize their strategy while 
taking into account their competitors and their possible strategies. The introduction of game 
theory within the PPP procurement literature is not entirely new, but has mainly considered the 
relationship between the government and a single (preferred) contractor:  
- Shen et al. (2007) considered the determination of the appropriate length of the 
concession period;  
- Medda (2007) has set up a risk allocation model through the bargaining process; 
- the problem of contract renegotiations has been studied by Ho (2008) and Menezes and 
Ryan (forthcoming); 
- Tserng et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of national PPP units in promoting PPP 
projects; 
- the synergy effects received attention by Fandel et al. (2012) who introduce the 
Cobb/Douglas production function to determine the Nash solution of the cooperative 
game among different partners in a social PPP. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Ho (2008) theoretically studies the competition between 
candidate PPP contractors and how bidding is influenced by government compensation of the 
research cost. 
In our research, the project is initiated by the government (N, which stands for nature in 
Figure 1). According to assumption 1, the number of shortlisted bidders and their experience is 
common knowledge for all players. Consequently, a sub-game                is identified 
for each combination of the experience levels. A discrete number of experience levels on a scale 
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from zero (i.e., no experience) to ten (i.e., maximum experience) is set up. A game with   
players and   levels of experience would lead to   
        
         
 sub-games or bidding 
environments. Relying on the notion of sub-game perfectness (Gibbons, 1992), all contractors   
will determine their optimal strategy   
  for each sub-game. The strategy    is a combination of 
which percentage       is invested in pre-tender research and which mark-up percentage       
is applied to the estimated cost. It is in our goals to determine the Nash equilibrium strategy 
profiles of a sub-game. In a Nash equilibrium, none of the bidders has an incentive to deviate 
from its current strategy   
 , given the strategy profile of its competitors    
 . In other words, a 
Nash equilibrium strategy profile       
    
      
   can then be identified if it satisfies 
               
     
            
  .  
[FIGURE 1 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
3.5 The analytical model 
This section analytically characterizes the equilibrium strategy profile for a sub-game 
              . Figure 2 serves as an example with two players and normal distributions.  
[FIGURE 2 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
Initially, a contractor   has a cost distribution function   
  which is a function of his experience 
level   . According to assumptions 3 and 4 and without considering any investment, a player 
with more experience has an initial cost distribution   
  with both a smaller expected value as 
well as a smaller variance. Relying on assumption 2, the uncontrollable risk    is the same for all 
players while the controllable part, quantified in   
  is experience and strategy dependent. The 
controllable risk can be accounted for through experience which explains why a more 
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experienced player already has a knowledge advantage that is translated into a smaller variance 
of the function   
 .  
Investing in research also reduces the controllable risk. For the construction of a toll road, a 
contractor engages in market studies in order to grasp the demand for the toll road and he may 
consequently align the findings with the capacity of the road. Eventually,   
  is calculated for a 
given investment percentage and a given experience level and is expressed as a percentage value 
of the initial actual cost. The investment percentage transforms the cost distribution: because of 
the knowledge impact, the controllable risk decreases, which results in a smaller variance and 
because of innovations, the expected cost is shifted to the left. The combination of the experience 
level and the investment effort results in the cost distribution   . The second element of the 
strategy is the mark-up. When the mark-up choice is introduced, the cost curves are shifted to the 
right, resulting in the bidding functions    for each player  .  
Assume a  -player environment for which the experience levels are given by the vector 
               and the strategy profile by               . Given the bidding function    
for player   and the associated cumulative bidding function   , the probability of winning for a 
player   is          and is calculated as: 
        ∫   (𝑥 ) [ ∏ ( −    𝑥  )
 
        
] 𝑑𝑥 
  
  
 
A player’s pay-off is dependent on the fact whether the player has won or lost the tender. When a 
player wins, he receives the money that he required according to the submitted proposal and the 
actual project cost is subtracted, together with the investment in research. In the case of a loss, 
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the investment in research will be partly incurred, conditional on whether the government 
reimburses a fraction 𝑑  [   ] of the research cost or not. It is assumed that each player wants 
to optimize the expected pay-off (assumption 7), which is given for a player   by the function: 
 [𝜋      ]         ( [  ̃|  ℎ𝑎  𝑤𝑜𝑛] − 𝐴 (  |  ) −      𝜇)
− ( −        )   − 𝑑      𝜇 
The pay-off function consists of the following building blocks: 
-    or the strategy for a player   which is associated with an investment choice  (  ) and a 
mark-up choice (  );  
-         or the probability that player   wins the tender with   the vector of strategies 
             and   the vector of experience levels            ; 
- 𝐴         or the actual cost, taking into account that player   has won. It equals the 
expected value of the cost function    that belongs to the winning contractor  . If    ℝ →
ℝ  [   ] is the function that reflects the fractional direct cost impact (assumption 4) that 
results from player  ’s experience level    and the investment percentage       related to 
strategy   , then we have 𝐴   +         ;  
- 𝑑 is the fraction of the investment cost that is reimbursed by the government;  
- 𝜇 is a scaling factor; 
- the term  [  ̃|  ℎ𝑎  𝑤𝑜𝑛] refers to the expected proposal that is made by player   on the 
condition that he has won the tender with   ̃ a random variable from the bidding function  
  .  
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The latter term of the pay-off function is calculated as a conditional expectation as we know that 
a bidder has won the tender (according to assumption 5). Therefore, that gives analytically: 
 [  ̃|  ̃ <   ̃   𝑘 ≠  ]   ∫ 𝑥 
  
  
   𝑥  ∏ ( −   (𝑥 ))
 
       
  
𝑑𝑥  
This is obtained in line with the general idea behind the conditional expectation of a random 
variable   given an event  , or  [   ]  ∫ 𝑥
        
     
  
  
𝑑𝑥. 
Consistent with Pareto efficiency, a contractor will prefer a strategy that generates the highest 
pay-off for a minimum variance of this pay-off. Let us assume that all contractors prefer to 
optimize their expected pay-off. When all the bidders simultaneously optimize their expected 
pay-off function, the following system of 2    equations needs to be solved and consists of the 
partial derivatives for each player’s pay-off with respect to both his investment level as well as 
his mark-up level:  
{
 
 
 
 
𝜕 [𝜋   
    ]
𝜕      
⁄   
𝜕 [𝜋   
    ]
𝜕      
⁄   
            {  2    } 
The competition occurs among the contractors, but in fact the government is responsible for 
setting the bidding context. The government might for instance prefer to set a compensation level 
that minimizes the total expected payment, which would be translated into the objective function: 
  𝑛  ∑       ( [  ̃|  ̃ <   ̃  𝑘 ≠  ] + ∑ 𝑑       𝜇
 
       
)
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Fundamentally, this is a bi-level programming problem in which the government is the leader 
and the competition among the contractors serves as the lower level problem. Other 
governmental policies that have an influence on the lower level equilibrium are for instance the 
determination of the number of players allowed to send a proposal, the objective of the 
government itself (e.g., preferring a minimum cost approach or introducing a cost/quality trade-
off) and the number of projects in the pipeline. Albeit feasible, it is computationally intensive to 
calculate the pay-offs of a strategy profile. Analytically solving the system of differential 
equations is complex if we deal with an infinite number of strategies and multiple equilibria may 
exist. Therefore, the next section describes the discretization of the problem. Moreover, finding a 
Nash equilibrium is generally acknowledged to be a hard problem, which is proven by the 
complexity studies of Conitzer and Sandholm (2003) and Daskaladis et al. (2006). As a result, 
meta-heuristic procedures to approach a Nash equilibrium are described in Section 3.7. 
3.6 The procurement simulation 
An experiment has been set up in order to study the dynamics of a contractor’s bidding 
behavior. A bidding simulation approach is the favored methodology for three reasons. Firstly, 
the simulation of costs, bids and pay-offs avoids the computationally intensive analytical 
calculations. Secondly, the Monte Carlo simulations go beyond the expected value of the pay-
offs, but also give insight into its distribution. Thirdly, the simulation approach allows for 
considerable flexibility as different distributions can be easily tested.  
In line with the rationality of dealing with the total variance as the sum of the partial variances 
and the philosophy of diminishing scale effects, the knowledge impact assumption (assumption 
3) is implemented as follows:    
    
 (    (  ))  𝜇 ( 
 + (𝛾  
    (  ))
 
+ (𝛾  
     )
 
). 
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This formula introduces the project complexity parameters. 𝛾  is the maximum impact of a lack 
of investment. The larger this parameter, the greater the importance of investment on the 
accuracy of the cost estimate. Equivalently, 𝛾  is the maximum variance contribution of a lack of 
experience and quantifies the knowledge advantage of being experienced. 𝜆  and 𝜆  represent the 
respective associated growth parameters. 𝜇 is a scaling parameter and will be set to € 1,000,000. 
The implementation of the cost impact assumption equivalently relies on diminishing scale 
effects and is given by:      (    (  ))  𝛽  
    (  ) + 𝛽  
      with 𝛽  the innovation 
parameter related to the investment efforts and 𝛽  the efficiency parameter related to the 
experience. The resulting value lies in the interval [   ]. Referring to the alternative 
interpretation of assumption 4, an increase in both parameters could also be interpreted as a 
government that favours experience and investment or quality more than purely the required 
price and then expresses the monetary bid price discount for experience and quality. 
Recall that the experience vector   is given and commonly known. Each player determines his 
strategy    which refers to an investment percentage  (  )  and a mark-up percentage (  ) . 
The strategy profile   is then the combination of the strategies of all   players and given by a 
vector             . This is the input for the simulation of the final pay-offs. The output of the 
procedure is a pay-off distribution for each player. The average pay-offs for a particular strategy 
profile                are given by the pay-off vector   (                   ).  
Consider Gaussian cost and bidding distributions. In a single iteration, an actual cost and a bid 
for each player are generated. The reference actual cost Ã is a random variable that is drawn from 
the distribution 𝑁 𝜇   
   with 𝜇  €          and   
   𝜇      and that is the same for all 
players. The final actual cost will be different, because it is related to the particular cost 
21 
 
distribution of the winner of the tender. The expected project cost for a particular player   results 
then from the linear transformation Ã  Ã  +    , which is set to the mean of the cost 
estimate function    for player  . Hence,    is a nested function (El Otmani and Maul, 2009) of 
the form   ~𝑁(𝜇( +   ) ( +   )
 
(  
 +   
 )). The contractor’s estimated cost 𝐶 ̃ is 
randomly selected from    and eventually, a contractor applies the mark-up level      , 
resulting in the bid:   ̃    +       𝐶 ̃. In summary, the form of the bidding function    in 
this procurement simulation is: 
  ~𝑁 (𝜇( +      )( +   ) ( +      )
 
( +   )
 
(  
 +   
 )) 
The minimum of these simulated bids is the winning proposal and its pay-off is determined, 
where the actual bid is 𝐴 ̃ for winner 𝑤. The losers’ pay-offs equal the fraction of the pre-tender 
investments that are not reimbursed by the government. As soon as a predefined number of 
replications   has been reached, the simulation algorithm stops and a pay-off distribution for 
each player can be determined. 
 3.7 Equilibrium approximation algorithms 
Another simplification of the analytical model lies in the discretization of the problem. 
Instead of allowing an infinite number of strategies, discrete numbers of integer investment and 
mark-up percentages are studied. Consider   investment choices and  mark-up choices for each 
player. Consequently, a player has     strategies to choose from. The set of strategies for a 
player   is   . This results in      
  strategy profiles, which will be referred to as      
       . A strategy profile is given by                and    . The pay-off vector of a 
particular strategy profile   is   (                  ).  
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 3.7.1 Algorithm A: Nash equilibrium algorithm 
A first heuristic calculates the pay-off distribution for each strategy profile  . For an 
experience vector  , each combination of strategies is sent to the simulation procedure explained 
in Section 3.6. The output is an average pay-off vector   and the variance of the pay-offs. When 
all the pay-off calculations of the pay-off matrix cells have been performed, the algorithm 
identifies the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Define    as the strategy for player   and     a 
strategy vector of all players except player  . If all players prefer to optimize their expected pay-
offs, a strategy profile       
    
      
   is a Nash equilibrium if it satisfies       
        
     
            
  . Moreover, we need to take into account that the pay-offs are based 
on simulations, so we add an additional constraint: the two-sample t-statistic needs to prove that 
the expected pay-off is significantly greater than the pay-off of a differing strategy. Nonetheless, 
there is no guarantee to find a unique Nash equilibrium and computation times increase 
exponentially when more players and/or more strategies are included. Algorithm B tries to 
overcome these issues. 
3.7.2 Algorithm B: Strategy game algorithm 
A second algorithm approximates the Nash equilibrium by determining a best response for a 
player   after first restricting the strategy space     for the competitors. Given the experience 
vector               , we want to determine the best response for player   {  2    } 
with experience level   . The algorithm will now do a prequalification of the strategies for all the 
 −   competitors of player  . Initially, every competitor   has a set of strategies    and the 
heuristic will reduce this set to a set of shortlisted strategies    with 𝑛 elements. The 
prequalification is done in two stages: a homogeneous stage to grasp the project characteristics in 
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the shortlisted strategies and a heterogeneous stage to emphasize the competition aspect. After 
the prequalification, the strategy game algorithm is executed. A detailed overview of the 
algorithms is given in Appendix 1. 
 3.7.2.1 Homogeneous stage 
Player   with experience level    has a set of strategies    at his possession. The 
homogeneous stage resembles a knock-out tournament. A predefined number of rounds   is set 
and the experience levels are set equal to  ’s experience level    for all players. In the first round 
   strategies are selected randomly and divided in      groups of   strategies. For each group of 
strategies, the average pay-offs are calculated and the best performing strategy continues to the 
next round where only      strategies are remaining. The procedure continues until   strategies 
remain and these are transferred to the set of shortlisted strategies   .  
 3.7.2.2 Heterogeneous stage 
In this second stage, we keep the original experience vector   and for each competitor   an 
intermediate game is played in which all his strategies are assessed against random strategies for 
his opponents. In each iteration of the algorithm, random strategies from the complete set of 
strategies are selected for the competitors of player  . This results in the vector     which 
represents the strategy profile for the opponents of player  . Next, the expected pay-off and its 
variance is calculated for all the possible strategies from the set    given the strategy profile     
for his competitors and the experience vector  . In the next iteration, new strategies are randomly 
selected for player  ’s competitors. After a user-defined number of iterations 𝑘 , the pay-off 
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distribution for each strategy of player   is derived and the best strategies are selected to be part 
of the shortlisted strategy list   . 
 3.7.2.3 Strategy game algorithm 
When the shortlisting is performed for each competitor   of player  , the final assessment 
stage will start. For each iteration of the algorithm, strategies are selected for the competitors of 
player  . For competitor  , these strategies are generated from the respective shortlisted sets   . 
This results in a strategy profile    . Player   will now calculate the pay-off for each of the 
strategies of his set   . In the next iteration, new strategies are selected for the opponents of 
player   and the pay-offs for this scenario are calculated. After 𝑘  iterations, the average over all 
scenarios is calculated for each of the strategies from the set    and the best performing strategy 
for player   is assumed to be a good proxy for the equilibrium strategy for this player. 
 3.7.2.4 Example 
Assume a three-player environment with experience vector    2     . If we want to define 
the equilibrium strategy for player 1 with experience level    2, the algorithm commences 
with the shortlisting of strategies for player 2 by playing a homogeneous game with experience 
levels         and a heterogeneous game with vector  2      in which random strategies are 
created for players 1 and 3. Afterwards, shortlisting is executed for player 3 through the 
homogeneous game with experience vector         and a heterogeneous game with vector 
 2     , but now with a random strategy generation for players 1 and 2. If this stage is finished, 
the actual best response determination for player 1 can start. In each iteration, a strategy is 
selected from the respective shortlists for players 2 and 3 and the expected pay-off is calculated 
for each possible strategy of player 1.  
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3.8 Experimental setting 
Both algorithms were implemented in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. Tables 1-3 recapitulate 
the explanation of the parameter values, the tested strategies and the algorithm specifications. An 
extensive sensitivity study has been performed together with an ANOVA analysis of all the 
scenarios. The output of the Nash equilibrium algorithm is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
strategy profile, while the strategy game algorithm output reports the approximate equilibrium 
strategy for a single player. The results are presented in Table 4 and Figures 3-12 and focus on 
the dynamics of the equilibrium behavior.  
[TABLES 1-3 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
4. Experimental results 
4.1 Performance of the heuristics 
The Nash equilibrium heuristic has the advantage that it considers the entire search space and 
calculates the pay-offs for each strategy profile. Consequently, the computation times skyrocket 
when more strategies are taken into account. As the heuristic only looks into unique Nash 
equilibria, sometimes no equilibrium is reported (which occurred in 32.4% of the cases). On the 
other hand, sometimes multiple equilibria are found and then a pay-off dominance mechanism 
selects the highest pay-off generating equilibrium. Equilibrium examples for the Nash 
equilibrium heuristic are shown in Table 4. The strategy game heuristic reduces computation 
times, but has the disadvantage that it limits the search space, so that we might end up in a local 
optimum.  
[TABLE 4 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
4.2 Bidding environment 
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The bidding environment refers to the number of competitors and their respective experience 
levels. In practice, governments usually opt for three shortlisted contractors, but evidence for two 
to five contractors can be found. Figures 3 and 4 are the output of the two sensitivity studies of a 
strategy game with three players and report the equilibrium response for a reference contractor 
with the experience level    tabulated in the upper left corner of each matrix and the competitors’ 
experience levels on the horizontal and vertical axes. Each strategy consists of an investment 
level (i.e., elements below the diagonal) and a mark-up level (i.e., elements above the diagonal). 
A glance at both figures confirms the general dependency on the bidding situation. If the 
experience levels increase, the outcome is modified. But also within each matrix, the reported 
optimal investment levels and mark-up levels significantly vary according to the experience 
levels of the other two players. Eventually, the introduction of heterogeneity seems useful as the 
equilibria modify according to the sub-game. Ceteris paribus, two main effects are apparent: (1) 
the more experienced a player gets, the lower will be the mark-up and the higher the investment 
percentage and (2) the smaller the competitive disadvantage for a given experience level 
compared to the level of the opponents, the lower the mark-up and the higher the investment 
percentage. Even for small experience gaps, the least experienced player is not or only limitedly 
motivated to perform the risky upfront investment. The latter effect is more outspoken in the 
lower experience cases, but flattens out as soon as     . The interaction plot of Figure 6 
visualizes the statements and reveals some opportunistic behavior in the case where an 
experienced player is playing against two new contractors. The incumbent exploits his 
knowledge and cost advantage over the entrants by setting a higher mark-up.  
[FIGURES 3, 4, 5 AND 6 TO BE INSERTED SOMEWHERE AROUND HERE] 
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The behavioral dynamics differ according to the experience-related parameters (see Figure 7). 
In case of an increase of the cost disadvantage parameter 𝛽 , inexperienced players move 
towards higher mark-up levels, especially when the cost disadvantage enlarges. This is the result 
of a larger shift of the cost curves that gives rise to higher winning probabilities for experienced 
players. In other words, if governments would attribute more attention to past experience, 
inexperienced players will be reticent to come up with a competitive proposal, which could lead 
to a saturation of the market. A similar effect is related to the knowledge requirement parameter 
𝛾  when a project’s complexity necessitates more knowledge. The margin rockets up and puts a 
break on the investment of inexperienced players, thus limiting competition. An increase in these 
parameters leads to a surge in the expected government cost (Figure 7(a,b)). For an increase in 
𝛾 , the government cost goes up faster in the case of two inexperienced players, while it is stable 
or decreasing when there are at least two experienced players due to the competitive forces.  
[FIGURE 7 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
Another characterization of the bidding environment is the number of players. Figure 8 shows 
the boxplots of the simulation outcomes of the aggregate scenarios for a constant uncontrollable 
project risk and confirms that in the four-player cases, the optimal investment response is lower 
and the optimal mark-up level is higher than in the three-player environment while the pay-offs 
are significantly lower. Less experienced players are much more reluctant to invest because of 
the decreased probability of winning and will in fact stay out of the market. Possible government 
incentives will be less effective, especially for the incentive creation of inexperienced players. 
[FIGURE 8 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
Two-player results look more promising from a competition perspective (Figure 9): there is a 
more levelled behavior of the players. Inexperienced players tend to be aware of their reasonable 
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probability of winning and the combination of competitive forces and the avoidance of the 
winner’s curse actually keeps them in the market. Nevertheless, the mark-ups soar, so that a 
higher government cost might be expected. 
[FIGURE 9 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
4.3 Project characteristics 
PPP projects are wide-ranging in their complexity. One could argue that transportation 
infrastructure projects have a more complex nature and deal with greater contingencies than 
social housing PPPs for instance. The model accounts for complexity and uncertainty in the form 
of the variance of the contractor’s cost distribution function. Risk is classified in two categories: 
controllable and uncontrollable risk. Looking at the controllable risk share, the influence of the 
innovation parameter 𝛾  deserves particular attention. It is the uncertainty that can be accounted 
for by performing pre-tender research (e.g., surveys, feasibility studies, R&D) and is that part of 
the risk that is not determined by past project experience. One could claim that 𝛾  attains higher 
values for highly complex transportation projects than for social housing projects, leading to 
more uncertainties in incomes and expenses. The innovation parameter has a mark-up impact and 
an investment impact regardless of the experience level as shown in Figure 3. Nevertheless, the 
behavior differs according to the experience level. Experienced players move towards a high 
mark-up together with a higher investment once 𝛾  increases. Inexperienced players (i.e.,     ) 
move towards the cap mark-up value of 50% without investment which inherently means that 
they do not participate. This is accelerated when also the experiential cost disadvantage 
parameter 𝛽  or the uncertainty due to a lack of experience 𝛾  increases.  
The uncontrollable risk is related to force majeure risk or an unaccountable part of the 
demand risk for instance and has an exponential impact on the preferred mark-up. The 
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uncontrollable project risk is an inhibitor for investment behavior. The players safeguard against 
the downside risk of exuberant costs, but because of the normal distribution modeling, the 
outcome might be positive as well. As a consequence, both the average pay-off for the player as 
well as the government cost increase sharply and the standard errors of the expected pay-offs 
will decrease (Figure 10 versus Figure 11). Interestingly, as the share of the uncontrollable 
project risk gets larger, ceteris paribus, the heterogeneity among players and the disadvantage of 
the inexperienced player is dissolving and the players’ behavior converges towards an equal 
investment level which is related to the complexity of the project 𝛾  and a relatively higher mark-
up. As a consequence, the expected government cost soars. As it comes at a large expense, the 
public entity should beware of transferring uncontrollable risk. 
[FIGURES 10 & 11 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
 4.4 Government intervention 
This paper introduces a percentage-wise compensation 𝑑 to all the losing bidders. In line with 
the expectations, a surge in the government compensation level leads to a significant increase in 
the average investment level, but the effect’s magnitude and the threshold 𝑑 that shifts the 
equilibrium interacts with other parameters that define whether and when a reimbursement is 
justified. Assume again a common three-player environment as the base case. The response is 
clearly dependent on the contractor’s experience level. As in Figure 4, a less experienced player 
demands a higher compensation contribution. Moreover, the movement towards an investment 
initially manifests itself in situations where the competitor has a competitive strength, i.e., a sub-
game in which at least one opponent has an experience level that does not surpass that of the 
contractor. The threshold compensation level that makes the equilibrium shift towards higher 
investment levels is inversely related to the innovation parameter 𝛾 . In the larger 𝛾 -cases which 
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refer to highly complex and risky projects, players behave differently according to their 
experience level when no compensations are introduced. But, once a sufficiently high 
reimbursement is introduced, the playing field seems to become levelled and all the players 
behave likewise. Figure 4 suggests that a compensation of 50% of the investment cost can 
convince players with experience level      to actively participate, regardless of the 
competitive position of its opponents. According to the algorithm output, compensations of 80% 
trigger participation for players with    2 regardless of the competition and      if the 
knowledge gap is within bounds. It works as an incentive mechanism that refrains inexperienced 
players from becoming reluctant. As shown in Figure 4 and in the interaction plots of Figures 10 
and 12, there is an overall investment jump and a large drop in the mark-up. Also in the case 
with a small controllable uncertainty, the government might be willing to stimulate innovation 
and research by attributing reimbursements. If no research would be performed, a chance exists 
of selecting a wrong contractor who might fail to complete the contract which would lead to 
renegotiation issues. In that case, the compensation levels should be even higher (i.e., 90%) 
compared to highly uncertain projects. Of course, other determinants will modify these 
dynamics. The uncontrollable risk, for instance, is an inhibitor and postpones the investment 
decision for less experienced players. Additionally, 𝛽  contributes to the deceleration of the 
investment increase.  
[FIGURE 12 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
As a conclusion, a percentage-wise compensation policy by the government succeeds in 
diminishing the heterogeneity among players. The best responses get a more stable feature. The 
pay-offs for the players will still differ based on the experience level, but the probabilities of 
winning converge, just like the expected pay-off (e.g., Figure 10). Of course, this compensation 
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comes at a cost for the government (Figure 7(c)). In the low uncertainty cases, the compensation 
does not seem to incur a huge cost increase, even for high levels of 𝑑, while if 𝛾  grows larger, a 
trade-off should be made concerning to what extent they want to increase competition in the PPP 
market. Nevertheless, the societal value of the government compensation can be inestimable on 
the longer term while the cost for the government is within reason.  
Extending our view towards a four-player bidding environment, the reimbursements do not 
succeed in incentivizing inexperienced players to enter the market with a reasonable investment, 
because the belief of the winning probability is low. The two-player case suggests lower 
reimbursement percentages in low-risk projects and Figure 9 indicates that the competitive forces 
deliver enough incentives for reasonable pre-tender investments for all players which makes the 
introduction of reimbursements to equalize the market obsolete and makes it just more expensive 
for the government. 
 4.5 Other findings 
With respect to the simulation experiments, the effects of the efficiency parameter 𝛽  and the 
uncertainty due to an experiential lack 𝛾  mainly affect less experienced players. When these 
parameters surge, the enthusiasm to invest (more) falls back and usually a higher mark-up is 
preferred. Moreover, very experienced players exploit their advantage and can insist on a higher 
mark-up. They consequently charge extra for their maturity. The learning rate parameters 𝜆  and 
𝜆  make players more eager to invest faster. For 𝜆  the ceteris paribus effect on the investment 
level depends on the initial best response before the increase of the parameter value: the 
transition from a zero investment towards a one percent investment occurs faster and slows down 
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more rapidly, reaching a ceiling at a lower investment level than for a high learning rate. We 
refer to Table 4 for examples. 
 4.6 Robustness tests 
The assumptions are in line with industrial tendencies and the extensive sensitivity analysis 
contributes to the robustness of our findings. Moreover, two slightly different assumptions have 
been tested.  
First of all, the analytical model was implemented with cost and bidding functions that are 
normally distributed. In order to capture the possible asymmetry of the project cost, a gamma 
distribution has been implemented for which the parameters were calculated given the variance 
and the expected value of the project cost, in line with the set-up of Section 3.6. No significant 
differences in the dynamics were found. The major difference lies in the higher equilibrium 
mark-ups in nearly all scenarios, resulting in greater expected pay-offs.  
Secondly, all the statements so far are based on the highest pay-off generating strategies. 
Contractors could prefer another efficient, justifiable strategy that guarantees a smaller expected 
pay-off but with greater certainty (i.e., with a smaller standard error). Nevertheless, the 
simulation outcomes remain close to the previous ones and the compensation policy still 
succeeds in leveling the playing field under the assumption that all contractors have equal 
preferences. 
5. Discussion of the results 
The sensitivity analysis from the previous sections leaves room for discussion on the practical 
implications of the findings. PPPs are complex agreements and the long-term nature comes along 
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with considerable risk. Diverse jurisdictions deal differently with the procurement issues. The 
theoretical findings will now be triangulated with qualitative insights from practitioners in the 
international PPP field. The list of respondents can be found in Table 5. 
[TABLE 5 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
The bidding environment, which consists of the number of bidders and their respective 
experience levels, plays a significant role in the determination of the strategy equilibrium. Recall 
that the model represents the bidding mechanism after prequalification of the contractors who 
expressed interest. The results claim for a clear funneling principle. Neither the government nor 
the contractors benefit from an environment where four contractors are selected for the tender 
when considerable investments are required. Respondent A could agree with this finding for 
complex projects, but found it a bit surprising for less complex projects. In the latter case, it is 
mostly inexperienced contractors that suffer from their disadvantageous position. In the case 
with two bidders, both are incentivized to establish high-quality documents. Nonetheless, a 
government might fear for oligopolistic mechanisms and soaring bid prices, so they might prefer 
a three-player environment in order to reduce the government cost. The results agree that mark-
ups will be lower, but they also state that, especially in markets with large gaps in the experience 
levels, the entrant will face a low probability of winning and will therefore not be enthusiastic to 
put a lot of effort in the bid preparation. And indeed, bid costs consisting of design, but also the 
consortium’s working cost could amount up to two million euro for large Belgian projects 
(respondent G) and even 20 million dollar for mega-projects in Australia (respondent F). This is 
very sector specific. Respondent H experienced intrinsically attractive projects in the port and 
power sectors with fairly low bidding costs relative to the rewards of winning, while they are 
high in rail projects that are subject to market risk, attracting far less bidders. Respondent D 
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acknowledges that firms are reluctant to invest in bid preparation if they are not rewarded for the 
effort. He claims that the amount of investment should be positively correlated with the weight 
of the quality aspect in the selection process. In other words, the direct investment impact    
should be sufficient to overcome experience disadvantages.  
Moreover, the model supports that opportunistic behavior is apparent: incumbent firms use 
their experience advantage as a motive to require higher mark-ups, while inexperienced players 
tend to be averse for losing the upfront investments and in general initially apply higher mark-
ups, while the investment is only considered in a second instance. Consequently, the 
heterogeneity requires particular attention. Practitioner views tend to support the majority of the 
findings. Respondent A confirms that they will apply a different strategy if they approach a less 
competitive Australian market or a highly competitive, standardized and efficient market. When 
they first entered the international market, a lot of upfront bidding costs were spent on 
consultancy costs as they were not familiar with some jurisdictions and actually had a 
competitive disadvantage on incumbent firms. Appealed by the clear agenda of future projects 
and also by the government reimbursement package, the long-term risks were reduced, making 
these markets, although very competitive, still very attractive. Canada may serve as an example. 
Respondent B also notes that high investment requirements serve as barriers for entry and are 
often perceived as an advantage for bigger companies with robust financial backgrounds. 
Respondent G adds that large Belgian PPP projects usually attract the same bidding audience, 
but respondent I claims that the interest is still sufficient. Last but not least, only respondent F 
claimed that Australian construction costs are escalating at a rate above the inflation rate, while 
the other governmental and consultancy respondents believe the project costs for the government 
remained stable regardless of inflation and the increased financing cost after the financial crisis. 
35 
 
A reason could be that players are still building up maturity and are still facing serious 
competition or that through experiential learning on both the public as well as the private side 
efficiencies have been realized not only in the execution itself but also in the procurement 
process through standardization and the increased ability to more accurately estimate working 
costs (respondent G).  
The complexity of a project was translated into a risk measure to model the uncertainty of the 
project outcome. The famous PPP adagio of allocating the risk to the party that is best able to 
manage it, needs to be studied from a competitive point of view. The transfer of uncontrollable 
risk results in soaring mark-ups. Respondent B confirms that the transfer of tricky risks like the 
demand risk and the permits risk involves that the contractors will require high compensations, 
supported by the argument that if a contractor gets into trouble, the whole project becomes 
troublesome. Respondent H gives the example that in a developing country like Nigeria, with 
possible political instability and uncontrollable uncertainty, port and energy projects are 
financially very attractive because of the inefficient public sector alternative. On the other hand, 
the bidder should deal with the controllable risk like the operational risk and the capital 
expenditure risk. In contrast to large-scale, risky PPPs that require considerate investments in 
legal advice, less investment is usually necessary in low-risk projects with a more repetitive 
nature (e.g., sewage infrastructure, social housing) (respondent F). Inexperienced players will 
play on their mark-ups and will try to be the cheapest in order to obtain a position in the market 
and not necessarily by investing more upfront (respondent A). For more complex and more risky 
projects, the dynamics of the analytical results change. Players with experience will be more 
eager to perform pre-tender investments depending on the experience level they already have 
obtained and depending on the experience of their opponents. In mature markets, the competitive 
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mechanism seems to work well and qualitative bids ought to be expected. Respondent I supports 
that contractors are keen to take up risks, because if managed well, these projects allow for 
considerably higher profits compared to classic building projects where margins are under 
pressure. Nonetheless, banks will of course ask for considerable guarantees. According to the 
simulation results, inexperienced contractors are rather skeptical to enter the PPP market and to 
run the risk of the high investments. In the three-player case, often the least experienced player 
leaves the deal. In a situation with four players, relatively new contractors will be even less 
incentivized. This is in contrast with the two-player environment. But, as has been argued before, 
inviting only two entities for the tender might be more expensive and risky for the government.  
The study of a research compensation was then instigated. At the first sight, a sufficiently 
high compensation triggers a levelled behavior for all players regardless of the experience levels. 
In low-risk projects, all players will start to invest and the mark-ups remain stable. Nevertheless, 
compensation levels should be up to 80 or even 90% according to the results. A government 
compensation proves to give more prospering results for high-risk projects. A partial 
compensation of 80% triggers proper incentives for both incumbents as well as entrants. It 
enables the willingness to invest and withholds a player from setting a high mark-up. Respondent 
I believes that the introduction of government compensations triggers contractors’ incentives. He 
refers to the Dutch market in which principally only two consortia kept interest in PPPs as, 
together, they won all initial PPPs. The compensation of losing bidders in this context restored 
other bidders’ interest. Respondent A claims that compensations of at least 50% could start to 
make a significant difference, while respondent E believes the entire reimbursement to the 
prequalified SPVs would give positive results in the South African context. The initial 
heterogeneity among players becomes hazy and probabilities of winning get levelled. 
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Nevertheless, the awarding authority does not always have the budget to offer sufficient 
compensations and might only attribute amounts that can barely cover the design costs 
(respondent G). Admittedly, this might come at a considerable cost in the short run, but the 
societal value in the long run might be enormous: the compensation refrains the market from 
becoming oligopolistic and the probability of failure and renegotiations will shrink. The view of 
practitioners is ambiguous. At the private side of the interviewees, there was an agreement that 
compensations could be beneficial. Nonetheless, they claim there should only be compensations 
for complex projects and not for low-risk projects as this might trigger the trial-and-error 
behavior of contractors, unless the market is still developing (respondents A, B). Respondent F 
also believes that less attractive projects could become more attractive if compensations are 
introduced. Indeed, also theoretically, the investment percentages rise, but bids do not tend to 
become more aggressive, in contrast to what happens when compensations are introduced in 
complex projects. Respondent B believes in a threefold impact of bid compensations: more 
bidders will be attracted, bidding prices will be lower and it could enable also smaller projects to 
be delivered by PPPs. Within the public entity, there is no real agreement between jurisdictions. 
The KPMG report already pointed out the big dissimilarities among countries and also the 
interviews underline the differences. For instance, South Australia does not have a policy of 
providing compensation for bid costs, preferring to determine this on a case by case basis. South 
Australia also noted from its own experience that competition for PPP’s in SA had been strong 
even without a government commitment to provide compensation for bid costs (respondent C). 
On the other hand, its neighboring state Victoria sometimes does rely on compensations to open 
up the market. Respondent F is in favor of compensations if it is impossible to attract two bidders 
without compensations. In the Chilean context, compensations have been attributed to the second 
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and third runner-up because of the requirement of detailed design plans, which would refrain 
potential bidders to participate. This resulted in more bids than compensations. Authorities now 
often take the design out of the bidding process or assist data access to reduce bidding costs or 
they reduce the risk by packaging concession opportunities, like bundling high and low volume 
port terminals (respondent H). Nonetheless, both the KPMG repost as well as respondent F claim 
that the impact of a clear project pipeline might give more prospering results than the 
reimbursements. Respondent E calls the absence of a continuity of projects the major 
shortcoming in South Africa. Moreover, a contractor will always consider its current position 
and its other investment opportunities in order to determine the bidding strategy (respondents 
F,G) and most consortia are even not substantial enough to carry out more than two PPPs 
(respondent G). But through this pipeline, a contractor has the opportunity to recover the bid 
costs from previous lost tenders (respondent C,F). Although, sometimes it is not feasible to build 
this pipeline because of changes in government or the magnitude of projects (respondent H).  
6. Conclusions and future work 
This paper studied the procurement procedure of Public-Private Partnerships, agreements that 
usually involve high upfront research costs. A reasonable number of jurisdictions are looking for 
mechanisms to open up the market, but there is no agreement on possible policies to install. This 
paper contributes to the PPP research and auction theory field. The complex tendering procedure 
was translated into an auction format in which a contractor, who is characterized by a level of 
experience, first determines the amount of money to invest in research and in a second instance 
which mark-up is applicable. A Monte Carlo simulation was set up to model the bidding 
behavior and the resulting pay-off functions while approximation algorithms were developed to 
identify the Nash equilibrium.  
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The heterogeneity of the contractors has an important impact on the bidding equilibrium. It 
are especially new entrants that have difficulties to enter an already mature market if the project 
has a high degree of complexity and risk. The theoretical model advises governments to limit the 
number of players that are invited for the tender. On the other hand, a two-player environment 
can result in oligopolistic behavior. Instead, a three-player environment seems to work well. 
Both the theoretical model and the majority of practitioners agree that a reimbursement of 
bidding costs can help in opening up the market in the long run. The models suggest 
compensation levels of 80% which is a high fraction, but not uncommon in French and Canadian 
jurisdictions (KPMG, 2010) and also practitioners suggest a minimum reimbursement of 50% in 
order to be effective. According to the interviewees, this compensation seems to be less 
necessary in low-risk projects and this could even lead to opportunistic bidding behavior. In 
summary, the combination of theoretical results and practical validation has led to three concise 
policy recommendations:  
- The government should control the competition in heterogeneous markets through an 
appropriate funneling strategy; 
- A reduction of the complexity results in more incentivized bidders and lower costs; 
- In complex projects, bidding cost reimbursements succeed in levelling the playing field and 
increasing competition. 
These outcomes differ from previous conclusions in the academic PPP field that argued 
against reimbursements. The results that are presented are based on a single-shot auction. Future 
research focuses on an environment with a pipeline of projects, as in practice it is believed that 
this could serve as an appropriate incentive for entrants. This will lead to a proliferation of 
strategy choices and more powerful algorithms will need to be developed. Nevertheless, one 
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should also consider the resource limitations of contractors, so that contractors might not be able 
to engage in all projects.  
Moreover, the model leaves other possibilities for extensions that were suggested by 
practitioners: how do the dynamics change when the compensation policy is based on the 
ranking of the bids, when the compensation is paid by the winning bidder or when the research 
knowledge is shared among all competitors. Moreover, quantitative empirical research on 
investment and bidding data could highly contribute to the field. 
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Figure 1: Game tree for a two-player game. Each branch leaving from the initial node 𝑁 refers to 
a combination of experience levels, represented by the vector          . 
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Figure 2: Illustration of the theoretical distributions.   
  and   
  are the distributions for two players, where 
player 2 has more experience than player 1. Player 1 applies a high investment strategy and because of the 
direct cost impact, his function considerably shifts to the left and the variance decreases due to the 
knowledge impact assumption, resulting in the cost function   . Player 2 made a low investment choice 
and arrives in   . 𝐴  and 𝐴  represent the actual cost in occurrence of winning for that respective player. 
In the lower pane, both players apply their preferred mark-up choice (a low mark-up for player 1 and a 
high mark-up for player 2) arriving in the respective bidding functions    and   . 
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Parameter Interpretation Values 
  Uncontrollable project risk 5%,10%,15% 
𝛾  Maximum risk impact of a lack of experience 0.05,0.10 
𝛾  Maximum risk impact of a lack of investment 0.05,0.10,0.20 
𝜆  Experiential learning rate 0.25,0.50 
𝜆  Investment learning rate 0.25,0.50 
𝛽  Experiential cost disadvantage 0.05,0.10 
𝛽  Investment cost disadvantage 0,0.05 
𝜇  Experiential cost decrease rate 0.25,0.50 
𝜇  Investment cost decrease rate 0.25,0.50 
𝑑 Government compensation level 0,0.2,0.5,0.8,0.9 
Table 1: Parameter values used in the models 
 
 Nash equilibrium game Strategy game 
Experience levels 0,5,10 0,2,4,6,8,10 
Investment levels 0%,2%,4%,…,10% 0%,1%,2%,…,20% 
Mark-up levels 0%,8%,16%,…,40% 0%,1%,2%,…,50% 
Number of strategies 36 1,071 
Table 2: Values for situation factors and the possible choices for the investment percentages and the 
mark-up percentages 
 
Parameter Interpretation Value 
𝜇 Initial mean project cost 1,000,000 
  Number of simulation runs for pay-off calculation 1,000 
𝑛 Number of elements in strategy database    10 
𝑘  Number of iterations in the strategy game method 100 
𝑘  Number of iterations in the heterogeneous game 1,000 
  Number of rounds in the homogeneous game 6 
Table 3: Used values in the experiments for the different heuristics 
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 Model parameters Situation 
Nash equilibrium 
Investment/mark-up 
(simulated pay-off) 
Cost to 
government 
Ex.   𝛾  𝛾  𝜆  𝜆  𝛽  𝛽  𝜇  𝜇  𝑑            
    
    
  
4.3 Project risk (uncontrollable) 
1
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/8% 
(4,309) 
0%/8% 
(23,526) 
0%/8% 
(31,549) 
1,083,146 
2
 
0.1 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(15,633) 
0%/16% 
(37,007) 
0%/16% 
(44,449) 
1,116,535 
3
 
0.15 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/24% 
(24,330) 
0%/24% 
(44,591) 
0%/24% 
(55,404) 
1,144,562 
4.3 Project risk (controllable) 
4 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(14,303) 
0%/16% 
(37,453) 
0%/16% 
(40,291) 
1,117,603 
5 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/40% 
(9,002) 
2%/24% 
(40,795) 
2%/24% 
(48,844) 
1,161,433 
4.4 Government intervention 
6
a 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.6 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(10,599) 
2%/16% 
(29,101) 
2%/16% 
(39,000) 
1,143,690 
7
a,e 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
2%/16% 
(11,240) 
2%/16% 
(34,030) 
2%/16% 
(40,862) 
1,170,817 
8
b,f 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 5 5 5 
2%/16% 
(26,565) 
2%/16% 
(27,179) 
2%/16% 
(28,116) 
1,162,372 
9
b 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.6 5 5 5 
4%/16% 
(5,026) 
4%/16% 
(7,624) 
4%/16% 
(6,493) 
1,159,656 
10
c 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.4 0 5 10 
0%/40% 
(-4,407) 
4%/16% 
(17,071) 
4%/16% 
(23,158) 
1,135,921 
11
c 
0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
4%/24% 
(-2,669) 
4%/16% 
(20,353) 
4%/16% 
(31,608) 
1,189,107 
12
d 
0.05 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
2%/16% 
(12,188) 
2%/16% 
(31,526) 
2%/16% 
(40,268) 
1,167,906 
13
d 
0.05 0 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(3,240) 
2%/16% 
(35,817) 
2%/16% 
(53,504) 
1,169,270 
4.5 Other findings 
14
d 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.25 0 0 5 10 
0%/16% 
(1,087) 
0%/8% 
(29,101) 
0%/8% 
(50,710) 
1,107,749 
15
e 
0.05 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.8 0 5 10 
0%/24% 
(3,634) 
2%/16% 
(33,093) 
2%/16% 
(54,650) 
1,152,327 
16
f 
0.05 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.4 5 5 5 
0%/16% 
(4,689) 
2%/8% 
(10,865) 
2%/8% 
(11,738) 
1,087,805 
Table 4: Examples of Nash equilibria from the Nash equilibrium algorithm. The equilibria and respective 
pay-offs are based on the simulation of 1,000 projects. 
a 
Players react differently to compensation according to experience levels. 
b 
Higher innovation parameter is incentive to invest sooner. 
c
 Compensation helps to open up the market. 
d
 The efficiency parameter affects investment and mark-up behavior of inexperienced players. 
e
 The experiential knowledge requirement affects the inexperienced player’s strategy. 
f
 The learning rates affect the speed of the compensation effect. 
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Figure 3: Impact of the controllable uncertainty on the bidding behavior. Player 1’s strategy output (in 
percentage values) for a 3-player strategy game experiment with parameter values: 𝜆  𝜆   𝜇  𝜇  = 
0.25, 𝛾   0.05, 𝛽  = 0.05, 𝛽  = 0.05,   = 0.05 and 𝑑 = 0. The value for the innovation parameter 𝛾  is 
(from left to right) 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. 
   
   Mark-up choice 
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Figure 4: Impact of the compensation on the bidding behavior. Strategy output (in percentage values) for 
player 1 in a 3-player strategy game experiment with parameter values: 𝜆  𝜆   𝜇  𝜇  = 0.25, 𝛾   
0.05, 𝛾  = 0.20, 𝛽  = 0.10, 𝛽  = 0.05 and   = 0.05. The government compensation levels 𝑑 are (from left 
to right) 0%, 50%, 80% and 90% respectively.  
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Figure 5: Codification of the bidding environment. Relationship between the situation number and the 
experience level of the different players. The left table maps the situations of the Nash equilibrium 
method (for Figure 7). The right table maps the situation number for the strategy game results (for Figure 
6). 
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Figure 6: [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between    and the situation that refers to the experience levels    and    in the right table of 
Figure 5 in relationship with the investment level (left), the mark-up level (middle) and the pay-off for the scenarios in which  =5%. 
 
   
Figure 7: [Nash equilibrium algorithm] The left pane (a) shows the interaction between 𝛾  and the bidding situation in relationship with the 
government cost for all the scenarios with   = 5%. A relationship between the situation number and the respective experience levels is given in the 
left table of Figure 5. The middle pane (b) relates the efficiency parameter 𝛽  and the bidding situation to the total cost for the government. The 
right pane (c) shows the interaction between the government compensation policy and the innovation parameter related to the government cost for 
all scenarios with   = 5%. 
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Figure 8: [strategy game algorithm] Boxplots of all the aggregated scenario outcomes for   = 5% for the 3-player and 4-player case  
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Figure 9: Impact of the controllable uncertainty on the bidding behavior. Player 1’s strategy output in percentage values (mark-ups in the upper 
panes and investment in the lower matrices) for a 2-player strategy game experiment with parameter values: 𝜆  𝜆   𝜇  𝜇  = 0.25, 𝛾   
0.05, 𝛽  = 0.05, 𝛽  = 0.05,   = 0.05 and 𝑑 = 0. The value for the innovation parameter is (from left to right) 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. 
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Figure 10: [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between the innovation parameter 𝛾  and the government compensation level 𝑑 with the 
investment level (left), the mark-up level (middle) and the pay-off for the scenarios in which  =5% 
Figure 11: [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between the innovation parameter 𝛾  and the government compensation level 𝑑 with the 
investment level (left), the mark-up level (middle) and the pay-off for the scenarios in which  =15% 
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Figure 12: [strategy game algorithm] The interaction between the experience level    and the government compensation level 𝑑 with respect to the 
investment level (left), the mark-up level (middle) and the pay-off for the scenarios in which  =5% 
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Respondent Function Region of expertise 
A Executive director of investment company Australia and other developed 
countries 
B Independent PPP consultant Czech Republic 
C Manager at Department of Treasury & Finance 
South Australia 
South Australia 
D PPP project coordinator Chile 
E Independent PPP consultant South Africa 
F Construction lawyer Australia 
G Lawyer (public law) Belgium 
H Principal at infrastructure advisory service 
provider 
Developing countries 
I Director at advisory firm Belgium 
Table 5: Respondents for the validation interviews 
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Appendix 1 
ALGORITHM 1: StrategyGame      
𝑘   number of strategy game iterations 
1: for all  ≠   do 
2:   HomogeneousGame(   
3:  HeterogeneousGame( ) 
4: end for 
5: for     to 𝑘  do 
6:  for all  ≠   do 
7:   Select       randomly 
8:  end for 
9:  for all 𝑥     do 
10:                𝑥             
11:   CalculatePayoff(     
12:   𝜋 𝑥   𝜋 𝑥  +       
13:  end for 
14: end for 
15:   
   argmax {𝜋 𝑥     } 
 
ALGORITHM 2: HomogeneousGame( ) 
 𝑑   number of rounds 
1:     ℝ  
2:     (         ) 
3:    ℝ  
4:   ℝ 
 
 
5:  for     to      do 
6:  Select       randomly 
7: end for 
8: while  𝑑    do 
9:  for     to        do 
10:                               
11:   CalculatePayoff(       
12:       argmax {    
     }  
13:  end for 
14:   𝑑   𝑑 −   
15: end while 
16:             →    
 
ALGORITHM 3: HeterogeneousGame( ) 
𝑘   number of iterations 
𝑛  number of shortlisted strategies 
1: for     to 𝑘  do 
2:  for all  ≠   do 
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3:   Select       randomly 
4:  end for 
5:  for all 𝑥     do 
6:                𝑥             
7:   CalculatePayoff(     
8:   𝜋 𝑥   𝜋 𝑥  +       
9:  end for 
10: end for 
11: Sort(   𝜋 𝑥  )  
12: Best  𝑛 −    strategies →    
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